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Abstract
This article analyses the campaign to establish terrestrial digital children’s 
public service broadcasting in Australia. It finds that the development of the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s digital children’s channel (ABC3), an 
initiative initially embraced somewhat opportunistically, enabled an expansion 
strategy for the public service broadcaster that ultimately helped determine the 
shape of its current digital channel portfolio. Contrasting the collective and 
divergent interpretations of future audience behaviours and needs developed by 
the Australian Children’s Television Foundation (ACTF) and the ABC, it argues 
that both organisations developed strategies and made policy decisions that were 
influential in conditioning the current digital television ecology.
Advocates for public service broadcasting have long considered children’s programming 
to be one of its twin pillars – news and factual/documentary being the other. Prior to 
the advent of pay TV in 1995, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) faced 
little competition as a provider, and often a significant producer, of dedicated children’s 
and educational programming. However, with changes brought about by the transition 
to multi-channel subscription television, alongside a deregulated global television 
ecology that has seen traditional public service broadcasting (PSB) challenged by 
commercial transnational competitors, the ABC has been forced to defend the continued 
relevance of its traditional areas of programming strength. This article examines the 
process of strategic planning, responses to regulatory interventions and innovations in 
platform, infrastructure and content deployment through which the ABC established 
digital terrestrial children’s broadcasting in Australia (1998–2011). The development 
of the new digital children’s channel (ABC3) will be charted from its beginnings as 
an initiative of the Australian Children’s Television Foundation (ACTF) to its adoption 
as a joint strategy with the ABC. The article argues that, while the policy advocacy 
to establish ABC3 – the niche digital children’s channel – was initially formulated 
by another institution, it complemented the PSB’s long-standing digital television and 
content strategies. It finds that the establishment of ABC3 enabled the evolution of 
ABC’s current digital television portfolio.
The ABC enters digital TV
The news and children’s arms of the ABC are both central to its reputation and cultural 
legitimacy, addressing, as they do, the traditional Reithian formulation ‘to inform, 
educate and entertain’ as set out in the ABC Charter. Crucially, in the deregulated 
THE ABC, THE AUSTRALIAN CHILDREN’S 
TELEVISION FOUNDATION AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF DIGITAL CHILDREN’S 
TELEVISION IN AUSTRALIA
6Media International Australia
multi-channel era, these are also key areas of competition with subscription television. 
The recent history of the ABC, however, indicates that while it has been willing to 
fund maintenance and expansion of news platforms and other productions, children’s 
content has been contingent on external funding and partnerships. The attempt by the 
ABC to enter the commercial arena of pay TV has been discussed at length by other 
scholars (Debrett, 2010; Inglis, 2006; Westfield, 2000). The argument here begins by 
contextualising the ABC’s entry into digital terrestrial television before turning to a 
fuller account of the ABC’s digital television and programming strategies that informed 
the development of children’s content channels at the ABC.
Jock Given (2003: 139) has demonstrated how internationally sourced technologies 
formed the basis of the transformation to digital broadcasting in Australia, just as 
international policy settings influenced the final shape of Australia’s legislation. The 
Australian government began to shape the regulatory framework, technical standards 
and spectrum allocation decisions to establish a digital television broadcasting service 
in the 1990s (Given, 2003; Thomas, 2000). Legislative decisions taken in Australia in 
1998 and 2000 granted existing licensed commercial and national television services 
(incumbent free-to-air analogue broadcasters) a ‘full 7 MHz bandwidth digital TV 
channel’ (Given, 2003: 152) at no extra cost. They would be required to transmit a 
HDTV digital service while simultaneously broadcasting both SDTV digital and analogue 
transmissions. The commercial television licensees were not permitted to offer multi-
channel television services until the end of the simulcast period. The ABC and SBS 
were, but after much urging from various industry interest groups – particularly the pay 
TV lobby – permission to screen national news, sport, drama or films in English on 
their multi-channels was retracted (Given, 2003: 179). The genre restrictions imposed 
by the 2000 decisions impacted the implementation of the ABC’s strategy for its digital 
content streams and increased the profile of children’s services in its television strategy.
ABC Digital Television Content and Programming Strategy 1999
Before turning to what the ABC did with its first digital multi-channel, I will briefly 
outline what it would have liked to have done had the genre restrictions not been 
imposed. The ABC’s Digital Television Content and Programming Strategy (ABC, 1999a) 
anticipates developments that eventuated over a decade later. Significantly, however, it 
lacks the vision of a stand-alone, niche children’s channel. While the ABC sought to 
be able to broadcast high-definition television to a standard comparable to that of the 
commercial networks, its main advantage lay in an anticipated capacity to multi-channel 
and deliver interactive and on-demand content. Its funding basis insulated it from the 
effects of market fragmentation on advertising revenue, giving it an adaptive advantage 
in the transition to a digital ecology. Also, multi-channelling would allow the national 
broadcaster to extend its reach, and thus its cultural legitimacy, by providing specialist, 
low-budget programming in areas in which it had staffing and content expertise and 
existing cross-platform infrastructure (radio, television and online).
The ABC’s Submission to the Productivity Commission Review of the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 details more fully plans to use radio to capture content for ABC 
Online, stressing existing cross-platform reach, provision of a comprehensive ‘package 
of broadcasting and online services’, ‘developing cross media production skills’ and 
hosting ‘one of the most popular online sites in Australia’ (ABC, 1999b). While its 
submission to the Productivity Commission warned of the anti-competitive effects of 
the entry of foreign media giants on the ABC’s ability to survive as a purchaser and 
seller of quality content (ABC, 1999b: 17), its Digital Television Programming and 
Content Strategy paper to the ABC Board proposed strategies for providing content 
for an increased digital portfolio of ‘content streams’. In this, it anticipated norms in 
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the contemporary terrestrial economy for low digital multi-channel content budgets, 
basing its plans on a style of program ‘significantly cheaper and more cost effective 
than traditional mainstream television programming’ (ABC, 1999a).1
This rationale parallels the economy of historical and contemporary Australian pay 
TV schedules, with little content origination or first-run imported ‘marquee’ programs, 
except on premium channels. Significantly, the rights to premier sporting events and 
studio films – content most suited to HDTV enhancements – were (and are) well 
outside the budgets of the national broadcasters. Nevertheless, the ABC realised that, 
in addition to repurposing content from existing program units, an increased allocation 
of funding would be needed for new content acquisition or origination (ABC, 1999a).
In 1999, ahead of the final recommendation of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
(BSA) and related statutes and guidelines, the ABC began testing pilot concepts for two 
multi-channels – ‘Information’ and ‘Learning’ streams – and a ‘datacasting’ service, 
ostensibly using the digital spectrum. According to the ABC, datacasting would enable 
it ‘to draw on the programming resources it [had] already developed and make them 
available to smaller and more specialised audiences on demand’ (ABC, 1999a). On-
demand, in a PSB context, is conceived not as ‘pay per view’, but rather as targeting 
niche audiences to better serve Charter obligations (ABC, 1999a, 1999b; Debrett, 2010: 
24). This proposed ‘datacasting’ service was broadly comparable to the current ‘multi-
platform’ synergies between programming on radio and TV, delivered via the internet.
Many of the program extensions on ABC Online in 1999, such as Behind the News, 
were youth or education oriented, as there was an established audience for downloads 
and discussion. When the 2000 amendments to the BSA interdicted the idea of a news 
channel, the multi-channel concept developed by the ABC to share a single standard-
definition (SD) digital band combined a children’s entertainment block (ABC Kids) 
and a youth culture block (Fly TV).
ABC Kids (Version 1) and Fly TV, 2001–03
ABCKids/Fly TV has been seen as part of a gambit by the then ABC managing director, 
Jonathan Shier, to coax more funding out of a reluctant federal government, and its 
consequent demise is viewed as being due to political brinkmanship by his successor 
(Dempster, 2000; Inglis, 2006). However, as the ABC’s digital content strategy paper of 
1999 shows, children’s entertainment and education were key nodes of the programming 
and branding strategies through which the ABC sought to renew itself in the emergent 
digital landscape. It can be argued that, strategically, the ABC Kids/Fly TV initiative 
was also the first move in challenging subscription TV in the emergent multi-channel 
environment. The situation anticipated the market a decade later, in which the ABC’s 
real competitor for key demographics relevant to its Charter is not the commercial 
networks, but the pay TV providers. The Australian scenario thus parallels – albeit with 
significant differences – the experience of European PSB after deregulation.
Created in 2000, ABCKids/Fly TV also proved to be a crucible for issues and practices 
that have become crucial in a competitive multi-channel system: rights management; 
the extent to which content development on the digital channels functions as a kind of 
‘R&D’ (Born, 2003) for the ‘primary’ channel (or vice versa); and the television–web 
synergies that were an early proto-type of ‘360 degree’ multi-platform commissioning 
(Bennett and Strange, 2008). As its digital strategy documents make clear, the ABC was 
aware that it needed to embrace product differentiation strategies that were standard 
practice in Europe and the United States. Such ‘branding’ defined the global ‘corporate 
personalities’ (Caldwell, 2003) that dominated international children’s television (at the 
time, Disney, Nickelodeon, the Cartoon Network and Fox Kids). 
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ABC Kids and Fly TV shared SD Channel 21, with the former broadcasting from 
6.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m., and the latter from 6.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. They show the genesis 
of several strategies that have persisted within the ABC into the current digital terrestrial 
television (DTT) era, including channel branding, cross-linking to youth brands on 
other platforms (including radio and online)2 and schedule-building (managing rights 
to quality children’s programs that had been made ‘redundant’ elsewhere). Perhaps 
most crucially, they provide evidence of how much can be achieved with relatively 
low budgets using cross-platform repurposing of content and skills mobilised across 
several well-developed platforms. 
Instructively, this early digital initiative also demonstrated that, without strong financial 
commitment from government for new content origination, the ABC would be limited 
in its ambition to provide Australian market leadership in children’s entertainment and 
educational content.
Branding, synergies, scheduling and program strategies
ABC Kids (Version 1) pioneered the development of a cross-platform identity, leveraging 
established online brands (personal communication with Donna Andrews, 2010). It tested 
the prototype of the multi-platform ‘channel’ and property that has become standard 
today, exemplified by the ‘on-air’ and ‘online’ content streams that anchor ABC3 and its 
participatory digital strategy (Rutherford and Brown, 2012). Nonetheless, DTT required 
new content and rights-management strategies. In realising its first digital channel, ABC 
television executives had to consider for the first time separate digital rights and repeat 
rights for ‘legacy’ content, produced for commercial terrestrial networks to fulfil their 
quota obligations under the Children’s Television Standards (CTS) (ACMA, 2010).
Another innovation in the ABC experience involved content-sharing and time-shifting 
of content across the multi-channel schedules. The contemporary concept of ‘catch-up’ 
viewing waited upon advances in video streaming technology. However, the insight of 
‘encore’ screening of drama content – contingent on an awareness that preschooler brands 
could easily be recycled since the audience was consistently renewed – was registered 
in emerging audience research (ACTF, 2005). Content acquired or originated for the 
ABC digital channels could therefore serve another audience on the ‘triplecast’ main 
channel, with its broader reach. ABC Kids (version 1) originated little content – limited 
to a few shorts, logos and interstitials – being for the most part an acquired schedule. 
Yet, because it did have additional funding for acquisitions for the classic children’s 
content still associated with ABC Children’s – notably BBC and ITV drama – it was 
able to feed the schedule of the main channel on a time-shifted basis.
Extending the reach of ABC digital: Negotiating carriage on pay platforms
ABC Kids and Fly TV clearly had problems in terms of reach. In 2001–03, less than 
3 per cent of Australian households had access to digital television (ACTF, 2005: 31). 
Despite this, former ABC TV executive Deirdre Brennan advised me that the ABC Kids 
logo achieved extremely high tracking levels, both locally and internationally, within a 
year of beginning transmission (personal communication, 2010). In addition, in homes 
serviced by the Austar platform, the ABC’s was the most popular of the children’s 
channels (ACTF and McGarrity, 2005). Concern for the low uptake of DTT led the 
ABC to negotiate with the major subscription television carriers in order to broaden 
the reach of its new channels. ABC Kids/Fly TV was retransmitted on the basic tier 
to all subscribers by Optus and Austar, but not by Foxtel, the leading pay TV provider 
(which was reluctant to admit competition to its Nickelodeon and Fox Kids channels). 
This meant that the ABC’s digital children’s channels were achieving limited penetration, 
mainly in regional Australia. The ABC’s managing director, Russell Balding, presented 
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government with an ultimatum: the children’s and youth channel combination would be 
axed if the ABC were not granted increased triennial funding (Inglis, 2006). None was 
forthcoming, and in June 200 the ABC’s first digital multi-channels ceased transmission. 
Balding issued a media release advising that:
The ABC multi-channels, ABC Kids and FLY, were established in 2001 to 
demonstrate the new programming and delivery models made possible by the 
transition to digital television. In demonstrating the concept, the multi-channels 
reflected ABC commitment to leadership and innovation in the emerging digital 
environment. However, they have also been funded on a non-recurrent basis and 
cannot be sustained without a new on-going source of funds. (ABC, 2004: 4)
However, because of the early indicators of support from audiences and a belief that, 
irrespective of the funding situation, the ABC could not ‘sit on [its] hands, and lag behind 
in the digital television revolution’ (Marriner, 2004), another (face-saving) solution was 
found. In August 2004, the ABC board approved the managing director’s proposal for a 
new digital television channel, ABC2, to be located under the New Media directorate. 
Costing only around A$2 million per annum (Marriner, 2004), it represented a low-cost 
alternative to the former digital children’s and youth combination.
ABC2 was envisaged as a comprehensively scheduled channel, allowing the public 
broadcaster to purposively shift its repertoire of children’s and adult documentary 
programs from its main channel to slots that enabled a second viewing window on 
digital. There were limited resources to acquire or commission content. Good Game 
(2005– ) – a video game review program – was one of the few new, but low-cost, 
youth formats developed for ABC2.
ABC2 launched with a substantial children’s block – a rebranded ABC Kids – but 
this consisted largely of programming already screened on the main ABC channels. 
However, further digital and cross-platform innovations were undertaken in this space. 
Like ABC Kids/Fly TV, the children’s content on ABC2 was supported by complementary 
web material such as Kids Video Lounge, Winged Sandals and Behind the News. In 
another experiment, following the 2006 carriage agreement with Foxtel, there was an 
extension of the Rollercoaster online brand to iTV, via a red button application (personal 
communication with Deirdre Brennan, 2010). Using the increased bandwith of the pay 
TV platform, ABC2 was able to offer rich audience participation of the kind previously 
envisaged in the 1999 Digital Television Programming and Content Strategy.
The road to ABC3
ABC2 (New Media) was a low-cost compromise. The article now analyses the historical 
policy interventions that enabled the transition to a branded children’s channel, designed 
from the outset as to exploit the cross-platform reach enabled by digital television. It 
is fair to say that without the policy activism of the ACTF, the ABC would not have 
won the funding for ABC3 that, arguably, enabled its current digital portfolio. Founded 
in 1982, the ACTF is a not-for-profit organisation that is the national focal point for 
children’s media production and policy. In recent years, the ACTF has moved from a 
‘production house model’ to focus on collaborations with outside producers and content 
distribution (ACTF, 2012).
The ATCF was a key driver in mobilising the government funding of ABC3 that 
shaped the development of the ABC’s current digital portfolio. The first motivation 
for a dedicated thematic children’s channel was born from the ACTF’s impetus to 
secure a prominent distribution channel for Australian content. During 2001–02, 
the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) undertook a review of the Australian 
Content Standard for commercial television. The issues paper released by the ABA 
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raised concerns about the production and financing of quality Australian C (children’s) 
drama programs, questioning whether children’s drama quotas should be maintained. 
The ACTF commissioned research and made a number of submissions over the period 
leading up to regulatory reviews of the Children’s Television Standards (CTS) in 
2002 and 2005. An oppositional discourse emerged between producers and free-to-air 
commercial broadcasters about the popularity of dedicated children’s programs with 
the target audience, and thus the regulatory rationale of the CTS. According to the 
ACTF’s CEO, Jenny Buckland: 
[I]t was that whole argument about do children like watching children’s television 
really? Because that was the thing that the [terrestrial] broadcasters always argued, 
that [children] don’t want to watch children’s television … And I suppose it 
was … the international experience that intrigued me, in that our shows would 
get – especially if they were sold to a commercial broadcaster – would get tiny 
audiences here, but would be in the top ten most popular children’s programs 
in the UK. (personal communication, 2010)
Buckland further notes that the ‘blue sky’ idea of an Australian children’s channel was 
floated as early as 2004 (personal communication, 2010). In March 2005, the idea 
was brought to the ACTF board. A discussion paper making the case for a dedicated 
channel was prepared and presented at the board’s Corporate Planning Day (ACTF, 
2005). In August 2005, a scoping study was prepared (ACTF and McGarrity, 2005), 
and the ACTF Board voted to commission Ian McGarrity, formerly of the ABC and 
then chair of the Board of Digital Broadcasting, to prepare a full feasibility study 
(McGarrity, 2005).
The ACTF argued that the complexities of the Australian television system had 
created a problem of access for most Australian children. The Children’s Television 
Standards regulated for a steady supply of dedicated Australian children’s programming, 
including quality drama; however, children were increasingly unable to consume the 
Australian product because of its placement in the free-to-air schedule and minimal 
availability on the pay TV channels. The ACTF commissioned its own research, using 
OzTAM ratings data, as well as detailed analyses of the amount of Australian content 
available on the pay TV children’s channels. Its analysis of the free-to-air commercial 
broadcasters revealed an increasing problem of availability, with more adult programs 
being scheduled in the late afternoons leading up to the evening news bulletins. As 
a consequence, programs for children, mandated by the CTS, were typically being 
scheduled in the 4.00–5.00 p.m. timeslot, when most of the target demographic was 
not yet home from school. The ABC, whose children’s schedule extended right up to 
6.00 p.m., remained the leader in free-to-air-only homes, despite its miserly budget for 
content. In the view of the ACTF, the ABC was ‘effectively getting away with being 
the leader in children’s television, solely because they scheduled in the right timeslots’ 
and had the popular preschool program Play School as a trusted brand (personal 
communication with Jenny Buckland, 2010).
Commercial free-to-air broadcasters were screening only the amount of Australian 
children’s content required to fulfil regulatory obligations, arguing that children’s 
programs were severely limited in their ability to generate advertising revenue (FACTS, 
2002: 29). They advocated being able to share programs with the ABC, or to trade 
their obligations to screen children’s programs to the public broadcaster. In effect, 
the CTS were pumping children’s content into the supply chain, but the low value of 
the content to the terrestrial broadcasters meant that it wasn’t being made available 
in such a way as to create audience awareness, and thus demand. Meanwhile, on pay 
TV, Australian age-appropriate content was minimal and consisted almost exclusively 
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of programs commissioned in the first place by the terrestrial networks to meet the 
CTS requirements. This state of affairs created the ground for the ACTF to make a 
persuasive case for market failure: neither the commercial free-to-air networks nor 
the subscription channels were able to provide reliable access to dedicated Australian 
children’s programs.
The ACTF as a policy actor
So where was the ABC while all this advocacy was taking place, ultimately on its behalf 
and very much consonant with its early digital television content strategy? The ABC 
was the ACTF’s preferred partner for the new children’s channel initiative from the 
outset (personal communication with Jenny Buckland, 2010). However, the campaign 
was carefully designed to be independent of the ABC. To begin with, according to 
some staff there were concerns about the perceived marginalisation of the Children’s 
Department within the ABC’s organisational structure, and its withdrawal from the 
production and commissioning of new Australian content. The ABC was not at that 
time sending its head of children’s television to engage with international markets, 
and while Sandra Levy – head of ABC Television – was perceived to be receptive 
to local children’s product, her budget barely stretched to commissions for the prime-
time schedule. Ian McGarrity recalled that another reason for keeping the national 
broadcaster at arm’s length from the children’s channel campaign was the historical 
antipathy of the Howard Coalition government towards any new funding for the ABC 
(personal communication, 2010).
Since the mid-1990s, the ACTF had developed into a key policy actor. As a 
statutory authority with public service values, it had a history of successful lobbying 
for government and business funding, and its constituent ministries embraced the Arts 
and Culture, and Education portfolios at both the state and federal levels. The ACTF’s 
area of concern – children’s rights – was shared by other government institutions, 
such as the State Commissioners for Children. It was not restricted to dialogue with a 
Communications ministry that remained largely hostile to the ABC during the Howard 
years (Inglis, 2006). During the mid- to late 2000s, its board had members connected 
with both major political parties,3 as well as the production, broadcasting, business 
and government sectors. In addition, its long-standing chairman was, and remains, the 
Western Australian business magnate, Janet Holmes à Court. Finally, the ACTF had 
been distributing its product in international markets for many years, and had extensive 
knowledge of ‘the children’s television community’ (Bryant, 2007).
Key ACTF arguments, 2005–06: Driving digital uptake; returns on investment in 
Australian content
Perhaps surprisingly, by the mid-2000s most Australians – including members of the 
ACTF board – had still not grasped the significance of the emerging multi-channel 
environment. However, the ACTF had been selling its product into the European multi-
channel market for many years, and co-financing with its public broadcasters. When 
the Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) 
released its discussion paper, Meeting the Digital Challenge: Reforming Australia’s 
Media in the Digital Age, calling for discussion of the business and regulatory impacts 
of new digital technologies, services and platforms, the ACTF was well rehearsed in 
its argument that ‘a well promoted Australian digital children’s channel, as an initiative 
of the Commonwealth Government, would act as an important and effective driver in 
converting Australian families to digital television’ (ACTF, 2006: 1). The ACTF cited 
the 2004 Barwise Review of the BBC’s digital television services, which reported that 
CBBC and CBeebies had ‘been drivers for uptake of terrestrial digital reception’ in 
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the UK market (ACTF, 2006: 8). The ACTF used the government’s digital agenda to 
promote both its own interests as a distributor and financer of Australian content and thus, 
indirectly, the ABC’s core values surrounding service provision to Australian children.
The ACTF drew attention to the existence of ‘legacy’ Australian children’s content, 
produced largely with government subsidy as a result of the regulatory mandates of 
the CTS. This discourse invoked core nationalistic values surrounding the Australian 
film and independent production sectors, as well as suggesting that a considerable 
investment in cultural production was being squandered as the result of the failure of 
an outdated policy response to the contemporary media landscape. In April 2006, The 
Australian published the ACTF research demonstrating the ‘market failure’ thesis, thus 
taking the case for a digital children’s channel to the public at large (MacClean, 2006).
The ACTF strategically scheduled its September 2006 board meeting in Canberra, 
providing an opportunity for sustained publicity and lobbying. It orchestrated a ‘premiere’ 
style launch of the children’s channel proposal, with a two-day blitz of meetings with 
MPs and advisers, and a prepared DVD featuring Australian children talking about 
Australian programming. In the course of various meetings with broadcasters, government 
policy advisers suggested that if a partnership with the ABC were negotiated, the digital 
children’s channel proposal might be considered (personal communication with Jenny 
Buckland, 2010). In turn, the media and political attention generated by the ACTF 
proved a catalyst for an official approach by the ABC.
An ABC–ACTF partnership
In 2006, the ABC appointed a new director of television (Kim Dalton)4 and a new managing 
director (Mark Scott). These appointments were perceived by the ACTF as heralding a 
new era that saw extra-institutional partnerships as a key plank of legitimacy (Buckland, 
2009: 122). Crucially, the ABC was now signalling its intent to partner with other national 
institutions and the independent production sector, and to engage in a new participatory 
relationship with its audience. For Dalton – a previous ACTF general manager and 
CEO of the Australian Film Commission – the children’s channel proposal was centred 
squarely in his main area of interest: the maintenance of Australian content origination. 
On taking up his post as ABC director of television, as Simon Hopkinson recalled, he 
shifted its strategies firmly towards partnerships with the independent production sector 
and away from any residual ABC nostalgia for in-house content origination (personal 
communication, 2010). For Scott, commitment to the children’s channel proposal was 
arguably more opportunistic. Nonetheless, both Scott and Dalton were able to perceive 
children’s television as a ground on which non-commercial values could be defended, a 
leveraging issue for additional resources for public broadcasting.
In November 2006, the ABC and the ACTF agreed formally to make the children’s 
channel proposal a joint campaign. During 2007, the ABC restructured to revitalise its 
children’s section and gear up for ABC3. Roles previously outsourced to other areas, such 
as scheduling and commissioning, were to be brought back within the new Children’s 
Department, and the position of executive head of children’s content was reinstated. 
At the same time, the divisional structure was also rearranged, to bring ABC2 and 
any subsequent multi-channels under the control of the director of television (personal 
communication with Kim Dalton, 2010). Some parts of New Media (Television Multi-
platform) also came under Television, while a new directorate, Innovation, assumed other 
functions formerly performed by New Media.
End-game, 2008–09
The Australian Labor Party came to power in November 2007, replacing an increasingly 
hostile Howard government. With the Global Financial Crisis, new Treasurer Wayne 
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Swan announced that only election commitments would be funded. Nonetheless, in 
2008 two important public platforms allowed the ACTF and the ABC to keep the 
children’s channel proposal on the cultural agenda. The first of these was the Australia 
2020 Summit. The second was a review by the renamed Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) of the national broadcasters in 
the lead-up to their 2009 Triennial Funding Agreements (DBCDE, 2008).
The Australia 2020 Summit marshalled an invitation-only list of influential Australians 
to discuss the nation-building agenda of the new Rudd government. The ‘Creative 
Australia’ stream’s brief included future directions for the public broadcasters. ACTF 
CEO Jenny Buckland, and ABC managing director Mark Scott were participants, 
alongside Foxtel CEO Kim Williams. The ABC and the ACTF submitted proposals 
prior to the event, outlining their joint vision for the future digital children’s channel 
(2020 Summit, 2008). Key areas of philosophy canvassed at the summit signalled a 
clear difference from the neoliberal perspective of the Howard era. There was a new 
articulation of the role of the state, in conjunction with its public broadcasters and 
creative industries, in promoting public goods, including regional and digital inclusiveness, 
technological innovation and participation, and a focus on ‘presenting Australia to the 
world’ through the mechanism of cultural diplomacy or ‘soft power’. Implicit in this 
latter idea is the resourcing of Australian cultural products. The way was paved for 
the funding of ABC3 in the May 2009 federal budget.
The evidence to date shows that the uptake of ABC3 has largely been a success. 
The most recent available data show the channel performing strongly in overall 
audience share (Screen Australia, 2013), as well as in comparison to pay TV providers 
such as Cartoon Network and Nikelodeon.5 According to the ABC’s 2011–12 Annual 
Report, the operating target of 50 per cent Australian content on ABC3 is being met 
successfully (2013: 52).
Conclusion
It might be argued that the resurgence of the ABC and concurrent arrival children’s 
digital content resulted from an accident of history, a combination of a change in 
government and the particular ‘end stage of a convergence journey’ (Dalton, 2009) 
that saw new technologies and delivery platforms drive a change in policy settings to 
reflect this new media environment. There is also evidence of an ongoing institutional 
culture of new media innovation, as well as commitment to children as a participatory 
audience, within the ABC that provided a base for mobilisation once additional resources 
were available. In hindsight, analysis of the 1999 Digital Television Programming and 
Content Strategy paper shows it to be remarkably prescient. It sets out the areas in 
which modest funding could be deployed to extend areas of competitive advantage 
for the ABC, and that leverage its cross-platform infrastructure to support its Charter 
responsibilities. The ‘streams’ outlined in that document conform relatively closely to 
the current shape of ABC News 24, ABC2 and ABC Multi-platform with iView. Only 
the vision of a dedicated, niche children’s channel is missing, and this difference can 
be attributed directly to the policy intervention of the ACTF.
This research finds that the success of the ABC3 campaign can be attributed largely 
to strategic alliances between institutions that share social democratic beliefs in funding 
public broadcasting and subsidy for original Australian content. The emergence of a 
digital children’s channel has allowed the ABC to build the strength of its brand around 
qualities associated with children, nation and the ethos of a participatory public sphere 
uncorrupted by the ‘limiting’ pressures of commercial media. The former controller of 
ABC Children, Tim Brooke-Hunt, stated that its new children’s television and multi-
platform section formed the blueprint for ABC Television’s restructure into a portfolio 
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of channels, each with a BBC-style controller, sourcing product from heads of content-
generating divisions (personal communication, 2010).
For the ACTF, the risks of a joint enterprise always lay in ceding control of its vision 
for the channel once it became part of the ABC. Diversity of genres and a large proportion 
of Australian content were matters of general agreement from the outset, while service to 
preschoolers and schools, and a less ‘entertainment-focused’ view of factual programming, 
were matters of ongoing dialogue (personal communication with Jenny Buckland, 2010). 
However, ABC3 and the extended preschooler block on ABC2 – given a soft relaunch in 
2011 as ABC4 Kids – have resulted in new commissions for Australian drama, comedy, 
non-drama and multimedia production, and constitute a continuing distribution channel 
for the productions of the ACTF and the independent sector.
Notes
1  ACTF research independently canvassed the economics of genre and format, and their impact 
on audience engagement (ACTF, 2005).
2  In the case of Fly, this cross-platform repurposing included links with Rage, Triple J national 
youth radio and youth-focused current affairs. Fly recruited young presenters, including 
popular youth radio presenters such as Myf Warhurst. A similar strategy was used for the 
branding of ABC3 in 2009, launched with an online ‘Me on 3’ campaign, to recruit fresh 
young talent for its on-screen branding. 
3  Board members included Shane Stone, then Liberal Party president, and Terry Bracks, the 
wife of former Victorian Labor premier Steve Bracks.
4  Dalton has subsequently left the ABC, replaced in 2013 by former SBS executive, Richard 
Finlayson.
5  See the OzTam: Measuring Audiences reports for 2013 at www.oztam.com.au/
LatestAvailableReports.aspx.
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